

Series III
Speeches and
Writings,
1942-1967

Box 18, Folder 1

Published writings
on naval strategy

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AGREEMENT made this 18th day of May, 1960
by and between P. F. COLLIER & SON CORPORATION, with offices at 640 Fifth
Avenue, New York, N.Y., hereinafter called "Collier" and Rear Admiral

R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.) of 12 Mt. Vernon St.
Newport, R. I., hereinafter called the "Author."

The parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

1. The Author shall review, revise, and rewrite articles, write new articles, and do work as described in Schedule A hereto annexed.
2. The description in Schedule A covers all the work done by the Author in connection with the revision of Collier's Encyclopedia. This work is delivered by the Author to Collier for its exclusive use.
3. Upon acceptance by Collier of the work described in Schedule A and payment to the Author by Collier of the sums of money set forth in such schedule, the work done by the Author with respect to such articles shall become the property of Collier, and Collier shall have all literary and other property rights, therein, including complete publication rights and the right to copyright same in the name of P. F. Collier and Son Corporation.
4. Collier may, at its option, use the name of the Author in connection with the publication of the articles listed on Schedule A and in material designed to promote the sale of Collier's Encyclopedia or other books published by Collier in which such articles may be included or of which they may be a part.
5. Collier shall have the right to correct, revise, edit, or rewrite the work done by the Author with respect to the articles listed on Schedule A, but it is agreed that if Collier corrects, revises, edits, or rewrites the articles to any substantial extent Collier will not use the Author's name in connection with the publication thereof without the Author's consent first obtained.
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7. Nothing in this agreement shall obligate Collier to publish the articles listed on Schedule A attached or the work done by the Author with respect thereto, either in whole or in part.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this agreement the day and year first above written.

P. F. COLLIER & SON CORPORATION

BY

David Crawford

David Crawford, Managing Editor

Author

R. W. Bates
Rear Adm. R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)

DC 8/7/59

COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA

Schedule A

REVIEWER OR AUTHOR: Rear Adm. E.W.Bates, USN(Ret.) DATE May 18, 1960

ADDRESS: 12 Mt. Vernon St.
Newport, R.I. BY DUB:DH

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>Review Words</u>	<u>New Words</u>
Naval Strategy		900

Deadline: July 30, 1960

Other Work:

Total

900

FEE: \$30.00

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Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates (USN ret.)

12 Mt. Vernon St.

Newport, R.I.

1. You are hereby retained by the undersigned to review, revise, and rewrite articles, and write new articles as more fully described in Schedule "A" hereto annexed and made a part of this agreement.

2. Upon delivery to an acceptance by us of the work described in Schedule "A" and payment of the sum provided for therein, the articles shall be our sole and exclusive property, and all rights of any nature whatsoever in and to said articles shall inure to our benefit throughout the world, including the right to secure copyright and renewals and extensions thereof as an employer for hire.

It is expressly agreed that without limiting the foregoing, we may, in our sole discretion, correct, revise, edit and rewrite, excerpt, or otherwise utilize the work done by you hereunder or cause any of the foregoing to be done; and to publish and/or cause the publication thereof or refrain from so doing.

Without limiting our rights hereunder, it is agreed that if we correct, revise, edit, rewrite or excerpt the articles to any substantial extent, we will not use your name in connection with the publication thereof without first obtaining your consent.

3. We may, at our option, use your name, likeness and biographical data in connection with the use of your work and in connection with its promotion and sale.

4. You warrant that the work being done by you in connection with the articles listed on Schedule "A" is your exclusive and original work, except as to public domain material; that it contains no matter which, if published, will be libelous or otherwise contrary to law, or which will infringe upon any property right at common law or any statutory copyright; and that you will defend and hold us harmless from and against any suit, claim, demand or recovery arising out of, by reason of, or in connection with the breach of the foregoing warranties.

If the foregoing meets with your approval and consent please so indicate by signing in the place designated.

Very truly yours,

THE CROWELL-COLLIER PUBLISHING COMPANY

By _____

W. D. Halsey, Executive Editor

AGREED TO AND CONSENTED

R. W. Bates, Author

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COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA

Schedule A

NAME: **Richard W. Bates, Rear Admiral,** DATE **June 16, 1961**
 USN (ret.)
ADDRESS: **12 Mt. Vernon St.** BY **DuB**
 Newport, R. I.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVIEW WORDS</u>	<u>NEW WORDS</u>
Naval Tactics		1,650

Other Work:

MS rec'd 6/15/61

TOTAL

1,650

FEE: \$50.00

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12 Mount Vernon Street
Newport, Rhode Island
May 28, 1968

Dear Mr. Hayden:

In accordance with my telephone agreement with you, I am forwarding herewith my revised editions of Navy Strategy and Naval Tactics. Because of the importance today of unconventional warfare, and of Riverine warfare, it seemed wise to include some discussion of both of these types of warfare. And, since the introduction of nuclear power for surface ships, as well as for submarines, has increased the capability of these forces, it seems well to stress their employment a little more than heretofore. If my figures are correct, this caused the addition of slightly over one hundred (100) words.

I have changed the date of the contract to today (May 28th) and have changed the ten dollars (\$10.00) to twenty dollars (\$20.00) in accordance with your letter of April 4th. This was because it was on this basis that I started reviewing my papers for you. I think that I received your April 4th letter when I arrived in Newport about April 28th.

I want you to know that I was happy to do these papers for you even though it took a lot of time, some of which I could ill spare at the moment, as I was lecturing on "Command Decision" twice (about one week apart) in May at the Naval War College.

Finally, I wish to thank you for the privilege of writing for Colliers Encyclopedia, which is a very superior factor in the education of the American people.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. Bates
Rear Admiral, U.S.N. (ret.)

RWB/dw

Mr. David Hayden
Crowell-Collier Publishing Corporation
866 Third Avenue
New York, New York

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NAVAL STRATEGY

Naval strategy is that portion of military strategy which pertains to the employment of sea power to further national objectives. It may be offensive or defensive in nature. Offensive naval strategy exerts pressure on the enemy in order to gain further objectives; defensive naval strategy resists enemy pressures in order to prevent the loss of national objectives.

There are three major concepts of present day warfare. These are General Nuclear War, Limited War and Cold War. General Nuclear War occurs when there is unrestricted use of nuclear weapons; Limited War when solely conventional weapons are used, or when such weapons are used in conjunction with the restricted use of nuclear weapons; Cold War, when there is intense economic, political and psychological rivalry often accompanied by threats of force - a power struggle - just short of military conflict between major power blocs.

In all three of these concepts naval strategy exercises an important part, the importance of the part played being dependent on the nature of the military strategy.

In cold war it is the responsibility of the major nations while pursuing their national objectives to prevent either general nuclear war or limited war and, should it occur, to restrict limited war to acceptable proportions. This is known as the strategy of deterrence.

This strategy is based largely upon the concept that aggressors must know that should they start general nuclear war, the retaliatory forces of the non-aggressor nations would, even after this nuclear attack, continue to be sufficiently strong to destroy them. They must also know that should they start limited war, or cause one to be started, and employ small nuclear weapons, even for tactical purposes, the non-aggressor nations might respond with massive retaliation.

In recent years the development of long range ballistic missiles, the development of nuclear power for the propulsion of ships, and the marrying of these two into the nuclear powered missile firing submarines such as the U.S. Navy's Polaris submarines have given a new dimension to offensive naval strategy, while at the same time imposing additional heavy requirements on defensive naval strategy.

This is because of the almost complete invulnerability of these submarines which can submerge into obscure ocean depths, move where they will, and remain submerged for many days. During this time they can, with credibility, threaten destruction of almost any target, and can launch any desired attack when needed. Thus they greatly increase the offensive naval power. Paradoxical as it may seem, they are also powerful deterrents as well as powerful retaliatory weapons and therefore, increase also the defensive naval power. However, it is their offensive power which is the predominant factor in both cases. The importance of credibility - the belief on the part of the opponent that the enemy will, in fact, use his deterrent power - cannot be overestimated.

Naval strategy has a most important place in the deterrent phase of the cold war. Here the low vulnerability to missile attack of carrier striking forces, (due largely to their mobility) and the almost complete invulnerability of the nuclear powered missile firing submarines provide the assurance of adequate retaliation.

In nuclear war, naval strategy will consist largely of nuclear weapons attacks upon vital targets along the peripheries of and, on occasions, deep within the land masses of the world by carrier striking forces, and by missile firing nuclear powered submarines.

In limited war, it will consist largely of the employment of various elements of naval power at the selected objectives at the selected time and place.

Since the accomplishment of these operations is dependent upon command of the sea, which is defined as the keeping open of the sea-air communications on the one hand and their suppression to the detriment of the enemy on the other, the gaining and maintaining of this command of the sea becomes the chief objective of naval strategy. Without this command, a belligerent can neither move his own sea-air traffic freely nor prevent the enemy from doing so.

Command of the sea does not imply permanent undisputed command of the entire sea, but only command of those sea areas necessary to accomplish the objectives, and for the limited time required.

The terms are limited because it is not likely that either belligerent can possess sufficient strength everywhere to assure the successful movement of sea-air traffic in any portion of the sea, nor is it likely that a belligerent could devote his entire naval strength to obtaining and retaining complete command of the sea. Thus, nuclear powered missile firing submarines become highly important, for since the command of the sea will likely be incomplete, some of these submarines will be able to move into effective firing positions, in uncommanded waters, from whence they will be able to exert pressure either as a deterrent or as blackmail.

Command of the sea in nuclear war enables both nuclear powered missile submarines and carrier striking forces to operate in the areas necessary to the effective use of their weapons, and in limited war, it permits military strength such as carriers, amphibious forces and screening forces to be moved where needed, when needed.

To gain and maintain such command under a variety of unpredictable circumstances requires a flexible balanced combination of surface subsurface, air and logistic support forces. This fact is as valid today as ever.

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Richard W. Bates

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